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DEFINITION OF THE TERM: It is a difficult task to define the term 
“responsibility”. It can be understood as a moral value or as a legal 
principle, and both concepts can result in different understandings of the 
term. the issue of responsibility is topical in relation to contemporary 
civilizational problems.
HISTORICAL ANALYSIS OF THE TERM: the article discusses the 
historical and cultural context in which moral responsibility became an 
ethical concept of primary importance. It is argued that rejecting or not 
taking moral responsibility has harmful social consequences.
DISCUSSION OF THE TERM: the issue of responsibility is discussed 
from axiological, legal, and moral perspectives. Various ways of under-
standing this term are presented that are based on the concepts 
of Polish and German philosophers who have studied the ethics 
of responsibility.
SYSTEMATIC REFLECTION WITH CONCLUSIONS AND RECOM-
MENDATIONS: the article discusses the links between philosophical 
reflections on responsibility and Catholic social teaching, including 
the teachings of benedict XVI and Francis I. these papal teach-
ings address the following contemporary philosophical concepts 
of respon sibility: 1) the sources of moral responsibility; 2) the dif-
ference between legal and moral responsibility; 3) the historical and 
civilizational challenges that have led to changes in understandings 
of the concept of responsibility. Pope benedict XVI’s logic of gift and 
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Francis I’s integral ecology are both extensions of the philosophical 
concept of responsibility.
Keywords: moral responsibility, legal responsibility, the logic of gift, 
integral ecology, Ingarden, Jonas, Picht, Benedict XVI, 
Francis I
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definition of the term
Placing moral responsibility at the heart of modern political ethics is 
evidence of an awareness of the threats to civilisation that currently 
exist. The optimism that resulted from scientific progress – as was char-
acteristic of the culture of the 19th and early 20th centuries – has all but 
disappeared. Today, we are trying to balance the benefits of this prog-
ress with the threats that result from the technicisation of social life and 
the possibilities offered by science of interfering with nature, the human 
body, and the mind. The steadily growing world population (especially in 
countries with medium or low per capita income), the income disparities 
between rich and poor countries, the predatory exploitation of natural 
resources, the indebtedness of poor countries, the overpopulation of 
certain regions, hunger, economic migration – all these factors make the 
issue of the responsibility of individuals, companies, banks, institutions, 
states, and multinational corporations a fundamental one. 
 It is difficult to define responsibility as a concept. It can be understood 
as a value or as a principle of behaviour that is built on this value. Based 
on this value, we determine which behaviours deserve praise and which 
should be reprimanded, which are socially or legally acceptable, and 
which are viewed as appropriate or inappropriate behaviours. The value 
of responsibility determines the extent and nature of the moral obligation 
attached to it and provides the basis for legal responsibility, but these 
two aspects are not identical. Moral responsibility has a broader scope 
and – compared to legal responsibility – takes greater account of the 
intentions of the acting person. In axiological terms, moral responsibility 
complements freedom. When we refer to the rule of law, we focus on 
the legal context; when we talk about recognition or decency, we are 
referring to social approval of our behaviour or lifestyle. 
 The German philosopher Karl Jaspers considered that responsibility 
is linked to the rationality of moral choice because authentic responsibil-
ity arises when the subject consciously and voluntarily assumes a moral 
obligation. In this sense, the freedom of the individual is not so much about 
overcoming coercion and external constraints but is more about overcom-
ing one’s own tendencies to base one’s activities on self-will and rebel-
lion against the rules of social life. In fact, freedom that is based on the 
postulate of rationality is responsibility because the value of responsibility 
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determines the proper meaning of freedom (Jaspers, 1990, pp. 189–190). 
This leads one to the concept of freedom “to”, which is understood as 
voluntarily taking responsibility for the potential and actual consequences 
of our choices. The principles on which the subject bases his behaviour 
are based on his inner conviction that these principles are valid. The value 
of responsibility that is interpreted by reason takes the form of a principle 
(ethical norm) that should be observed in all aspects of life. At present, 
there is a systematic increase in the number of matters for which we are 
responsible, including the natural environment, the proper use of modern 
technology, and social relationships that are excessively reliant on the use 
of new media. This increase should be accompanied by a greater and 
deeper awareness of our responsibility for the effects of our decisions, but 
this is not always the case. 
 The most important contributions to the reflection on the issue 
of responsibility were made by the following German, Austrian, and 
French philosophers: Max Scheler, Nicolai Hartmann, Martin Buber, 
Wilhelm Weischedel, Dietrich Bonhoeffer, Karl Jaspers, Georg Picht, 
Hans Jonas, and Emmanuel Levinas. An important contribution to the 
discussion on the issue of responsibility was also made by the Polish 
philosopher Roman Ingarden, who was a phenomenologist and student 
of Edmund Husserl (Filek, 2004, pp. 9–10). Below, we will focus on 
analysing selected concepts of responsibility and linking them to papal 
teachings, especially those of Benedict XVI and Francis I.
Historical analysis of the term
The belief in a person’s value and his right to make decisions freely ema-
nates from the Christian tradition of Tertullian, Boethius, and St. Augustine. 
Ancient Greek philosophy did not consider this issue central to its interests. 
Christian philosophy saw man as a free being who was incapable of doing 
good when left to his own devices. Grace was the recipe that enabled 
man to lead a moral life. Grace was treated as an undeserved gift which 
was given to man by God, thanks to which new competences for good 
behaviour were added to our natural moral skills. The appreciation for the 
life of each human person that was expressed in medieval philosophy took 
on a new form in modern philosophy. Whereas human life was previously 
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considered part of the natural world order that was created by God, in 
modern thought man was placed at its centre. This is usually seen as the 
result of changes in the way in which people understood the world and 
as a breakthrough brought about by Descartes’ ideas. Egological orienta-
tion led to the rational subject being placed at the centre of the axiological 
structure of the world. One of the consequences of this shift from medieval 
philosophy towards ego cogito was that greater emphasis was given to 
the following values: freedom, self-determination, individual fulfilment, 
autonomy of conscience, and the individual’s right to make moral judge-
ments irrespective of the opinion of the authorities. This can be treated 
as a distant consequence of the evangelical appreciation of individual 
human life. The tension that exists today between what results from 
nature and what is a consequence of legal regulations is evident in 
discussions concerning the difference between civil rights and human 
rights.
 Not every moral decision is good for a person and/or the community in 
which that person lives. A point of reference is needed in order to realise 
the demand for self-fulfilment, or for spiritual authenticity. Immanuel Kant 
linked freedom with reason by introducing the principle of voluntary self-
limitation of the will, which requires the ability to make autonomous moral 
decisions. By recognizing external (biological or social) constraints, the 
human will would lose its ability to make independent decisions and 
would become a heteronomous will, i.e. a will that is limited by both 
sensual desires and the rules of community life. Paradoxically, restric-
tions that result from “pure practical reason” do not take away the right 
to self-determination of the will, so they do not destroy human freedom. 
The autonomous act of an individual must result not from fear of divine 
or human law, nor from the principle of reciprocity, i.e. the expectation 
of social reward in the form of others ‘giving back’ or ‘repaying’ our acts 
with acts of a similar nature (for example, honesty for honesty), but from 
voluntary recognition of the value of an act.
 Today, the value of freedom is highly appreciated, which makes it 
a condition for the realisation of other values. However, freedom is often 
subject to marketing manipulation, as, for example, when it is interpreted 
as a justification for the unrestricted consumption of material goods or 
sensual experiences. Such an understanding of freedom is particularly 
dangerous when the subject loses his ability to make prudent use of 
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material goods, becomes dependent on material things, or when his 
ability to evaluate his capabilities becomes distorted. Then he is gov-
erned by hubris (excessive pride): he loses the ability to assess a situa-
tion adequately and can make irresponsible decisions. Hence, freedom 
must be linked with responsibility. The conditions for exercising freedom 
include the subject’s conscious action, the real possibility of making 
choices, knowledge of oneself and of the world, an acknowledgement 
that we bear the consequences of our choices, and the psychological 
capacity to take responsibility. Indeed, today’s escape from freedom is 
not an escape from those aspects of freedom that are linked to pleasure; 
it is an escape from responsibility that is understood as something too 
heavy for the subject to carry, or an escape from acting in accordance 
with the rules imposed by institutions. From a psychological perspective, 
responsibility appears to be oppressive. However, this is not a proper 
understanding of responsibility.
discussion of the term 
The Polish phenomenologist Roman Ingarden described four situations 
in which responsibility is revealed: 
1. A person bears responsibility for something, or, in other words, is responsible 
for something. 2. A person assumes responsibility for something. 3. A person is 
held to be responsible for something. 4. A person acts responsibly” (Ingarden, 
1987, pp. 73–74).
He stressed that although these four situations are different perspec-
tives of the understanding of the four aspects of responsibility, there 
are certain links between them. They all relate to the subject and show 
a human being in a relationship of responsibility towards other subjects 
or towards the good that is entrusted to them. Essentially, responsibility 
is about actively taking on a commitment that affects people’s choices 
and behaviour. It is a possibility rather than a necessity because the 
subject may choose not to take on the responsibility, or he may evade 
it even though (by virtue of his role or job) it is somehow inscribed 
in his activities. Ingarden listed four assumptions related to personal 
responsibility:
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1. anthropological – a person is a conscious perpetrator of his actions; he is 
a personal being; he himself has decided what he can accomplish;
2. axiological – objective values exist; a person is able to identify these values; 
they are a reference point for human choices;
3. temporal-spatial existence of the world – human actions are inscribed in 
causal relationships; an act for which the perpetrator is responsible is his 
act, it is performed in the real world, and it has specific consequences; 
4. subjective freedom – man is the autonomous perpetrator of his acts; we talk 
of responsibility when we consider a subject’s voluntary act but not when we 
consider an act enforced by others or an act that is biologically determined 
(Ingarden, 1987, pp. 86–128). 
 The postulate of responsibility is a universal requirement, but it is 
usually interpreted in a particular way, i.e. as a moral task for a subject 
or a group of subjects. These two perspectives, general and particular, 
are sometimes difficult to reconcile. The scope of responsibility that 
a subject recognizes may be different from that which results from his-
torical and culturally defined circumstances. 
 It is worth considering the premise of responsibility that is understood 
as a universal task that is to be undertaken. The German philosopher 
Georg Picht believed that it is necessary to reverse the egological per-
spective in this understanding of responsibility, i.e. to begin with the 
object rather than the subject; for example, when a situation is faced 
courageously, this makes us responsible people. A subject that takes 
on an obligation is constituted only through the task and the specific 
responsibility that is contained within it. This task is historical in nature 
and extends before man to the horizon of a possible future. This is rec-
ognised primarily from the perspective of threats to civilisation. Picht 
believed that the conditions for responsibility could be found in human 
history because it is in history that responsibility is revealed in the area 
of collective consciousness (Picht, 1981, pp. 238, 255–258). This, 
however, entails a certain excess of responsibility related to what an 
individual subject can take on at a given time. There are situations in 
which someone should be responsible but no one (either individuals 
or institutions) is willing to take on the task (e.g. hunger or various 
forms of violence in the world, issues related to wars and economic 
exploitation). This is not a matter of individuals avoiding responsibil-
ity for fear of possible consequences; it is a matter of not promoting 
social awareness of responsible behaviour in relation to areas of social 
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life that go beyond our perception of which matters are important and 
worthwhile. It refers to institutions, organisations, and businesses to 
a greater extent than to individuals, but it is individuals who make deci-
sions in organisations.
 In this context, we should talk about the lack of an educational or 
cultural model that would encourage organisations’ employees to adopt 
responsible attitudes and help them to develop specific character traits, 
such as the virtue of responsibility. At a given historical moment, the lack 
of people who embody these character traits (especially the owners of 
large companies and the heads of corporations) is assessed by Picht 
in terms of collective moral guilt with consequences that effect every-
one (Filek, 2003, pp. 209–211). However, it is difficult to consider the 
issue of not taking responsibility in terms of a new interpretation of the 
consequences of original sin. First, responsibility requires a change of 
attitude: from those behaviours in which responsibility is “broken up” 
into fragments that concern us, to thinking more in terms of the broad 
horizon of universal responsibility, in which the essence of humanity is 
combined with responsibility. Second, it is about changing the way in 
which institutions are perceived: they should consider their decisions 
not only in economic and legal but also in moral terms. 
 According to another German philosopher, the theoretician of 
responsibility, Hans Jonas, a distinction should be made between natu-
ral responsibility, i.e. parental or familial (sister-brother) responsibility, 
and contractual (formal) responsibility. Natural responsibility is narrow in 
scope, although we sometimes use the rhetoric of natural responsibility 
to explain an individual’s personal and emotional involvement in a given 
case. Contractual responsibility is “established” when a person is 
assigned a task that has been imposed on him through a contract which 
he accepts. This undertaking of responsibility has been achieved by way 
of authority and has legal consequences. If a person damages some-
thing or refuses to act, he is punished with a fine or prison sentence, and 
sometimes an obligation to compensate the victim. The enforcement of 
a penalty presupposes the existence of appropriate institutions (courts), 
although their functioning is not perfect (Jonas, 1996, pp.180–185).
 Jonas linked the concept of contractual responsibility with that of 
“causative power”, i.e. a person’s ability to influence a given situation. 
A subject who is in the orbit of events will not always influence their 
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course, or his influence may depend on his social or professional role. 
The formula of causative power is based on the assumption that through 
our actions we have an influence on our environment and the lives of 
other people. A lack of conviction in this premise leads to social inactivity. 
A person’s actions are subject to the control of other people and institu-
tions. To some extent, the effects of our actions can also be predicted, 
or at least we should consider the possible consequences of any action 
we do take (Jonas, pp. 167–168). The term “causative power” suggests 
that responsibility depends on the subject’s real power and his technical 
and institutional capabilities. Decision-makers who are responsible for 
running companies and state and church institutions should be bound 
by the “the greater the power, the greater the responsibility” principle. 
This principle often goes unheeded because decision-makers are not 
aware of this responsibility or ignore it. 
 The traditional understanding of responsibility is based on the 
legal premise of the consequences of an act and holding the subject 
accountable for these consequences. In this legal understanding, we 
are responsible not for the intentions behind an act but for its results. 
The intentions of the perpetrator are taken into account insofar as they 
have influenced the act itself. This includes determining the degree of 
guilt of the perpetrator of an offence, which is dependent on his inten-
tions when committing the act. Furthermore, you cannot be responsible 
for something that has not yet happened. In the case of the aforemen-
tioned threats to civilisation, a legal understanding of responsibility is 
inadequate, and according to Jonas and Picht it should be expanded to 
include the context of moral responsibility. Moral responsibility assumes 
the responsibility of the subject even when he is not formally forced 
to assume responsibility. In this context, the voluntary nature of moral 
obligation is clearly visible. Linking moral responsibility with the con-
science (informed consent) brings it closer to the concept of natural 
responsibility. Amongst other things, we associate this understanding of 
responsibility with concern for the long-term effects of our actions, as is 
the case of parents and children, or teachers and pupils, for example. 
 It has been proposed to extend the scope of responsibility to cover 
areas that were not previously included in the premise of moral obliga-
tion, such as environmental protection and responsibility for future gen-
erations, but the predatory exploitation of raw materials could effectively 
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make this impossible. Jonas proposed replacing the “after deed” model 
of responsibility with the “before deed” model. Instead of post factum 
responsibility, he proposed preventive responsibility, which takes into 
account the future consequences of appropriate actions in order to 
eliminate behaviours that are associated with possible risks (Jonas, 
1996, pp. 171–173). Analysis of the consequences of the concept of 
“causative power” indicates that there are significant limitations in the 
concept of the responsibility of a particular person for the consequences 
of his actions. Predicting the long-term effects of behaviour is difficult. 
Even though employees leave companies or move to new positions, and 
members of supervisory boards and company presidents are replaced 
by others, the scope of responsibility held by an organisation should not 
change. Thus, the concept of the responsible organisation, in which the 
entity that is to be held responsible is the company or institution, is the 
focus for emphasis. In this respect, although, for example, a decision-
maker might have been replaced, the company still bears responsibility 
for the consequences of his actions.
 Limitations in responsibility (understood as responsibility held by 
a subject) can result in a narrow or fragmented scope of responsibility, 
as can be seen in different scopes of responsibility when applied to 
“relatives” and “strangers, for example. The scope of obligation towards 
relatives seems to be broader (it falls within the scope of natural respon-
sibility) than that of strangers, which is based more on the concept of 
contractual responsibility. These approaches to understanding respon-
sibility, however, seem to contradict our understanding of the virtues of 
solidarity and social justice. The attitude of responsibility presupposes 
that those who are more financially literate will be interested in the 
fate of those who, based on their natural and learned skills, are less 
financially literate and thus unable to function successfully in the free 
market economy. Solidarity and social justice presuppose an active atti-
tude both to noticing when this situation occurs and to acting when we 
should. This is especially true when we create principles for a social life 
in which sharing with others does not result from legal coercion (a struc-
tural fiscal system where the richer pay more taxes and the poorer pay 
less) but from a voluntary commitment of the rich towards the poor.
 Responsible behaviour is essential for the effective functioning of 
an organisation. Avoiding responsibility or narrowing its scope results 
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in a reduced level of trust towards a particular employee and towards 
the whole institution. Excessively bureaucratic institutions that oper-
ate on the basis of complicated procedures will result in their employ-
ees holding narrow moral obligations, thus making them officials of 
a system in which they professionally but ruthlessly perform tasks that 
are assigned to them. Education regarding the need for responsible 
behaviour could contribute to improving the functioning of the organisa-
tion as a structure that is aware of its responsibility. Individuals play 
different roles within an organisation, and sometimes changing a given 
role changes the perception of the nature of their responsibility within 
the organisation. Individual responsibility concerns specific individuals, 
while social responsibility concerns companies and institutions. 
 In the case of complex decision-making procedures and complex 
institutional structures, it is important to mention corporate social 
responsibility. This postulate combines elements of individual respon-
sibility with the requirements of preventive responsibility, and it links 
three important aspects: ecological (sustainable development), social 
(combating social exclusion), and ethical (companies that take on moral 
obligations) responsibility. The principle of responsibility is part of the 
logic of inclusion, i.e. broadening the scope of responsibility to include 
more groups of excluded persons and broadening the scope of matters 
for which they should be responsible. It is this activity of an organisa-
tion that goes beyond economic factors and takes into account social 
(unemployment, social exclusion of the disabled) and environmental 
(shaping ecological sensitivity) aspects of responsibility. 
 Placing the principle of responsibility at the centre of ethical think-
ing should enable a person to cope with difficult situations successfully, 
for example through understanding the consequences of his actions 
or developing a sensitive conscience and a sense of responsibility. 
Responsibility concerns both what we have done and what we have 
not done. This non-action may result from not fulfilling our duties, or it 
may be an expression of moral indifference to a situation in which we 
have the ability to help the needy, but this is not included in our “duty 
package”. One can remain indifferent to various forms of institutional 
violence that one unwittingly witnesses, and one can choose not to see 
certain things for the sake of protecting one’s narrow responsibilities. 
Similarly, not taking responsibility includes situations in which we decide 
176 mArIusz woJewodA
not to react when we see someone who intends to drive under the 
influence of alcohol, or we are indifferent to the fact that our neighbour 
burns rubbish and pollutes the air in the neighbourhood. Failure to act in 
these cases should be seen as an evasion of responsibility. Both moral 
responsibility and legal responsibility presuppose thinking in terms of 
the common good. One cannot exempt oneself from the need to react 
to inappropriate behaviour or to malpractice in institutions. The realiza-
tion of responsibility requires a civic attitude which consists in taking on 
commitments that are right but often do not result in social recognition.
 Developing a responsible attitude and a sensitive conscience is an 
important need of our times. The areas for which we are expected to be 
responsible are constantly increasing. This is why applied ethics, espe-
cially social (political) ethics, points to the need to shape character skills 
and habits that could be described as moral competences related to 
new areas of activity. These skills, with a particular focus on responsibil-
ity, should complement professional skills and sensitivity to the needs of 
other people. They should also complement social competences such 
as community building, communicative skills, media skills, and IT skills. 
Human activities are not axiologically neutral because they are embed-
ded in particular values, e.g., a focus on maximising profit, affirmation of 
life, professional success, or acting for the common good. Contempo-
rary communities take on different forms: from traditional ones (family, 
local environment, Church) to internet communities. Now it is necessary 
to link these values with responsibility for the quality of life of the people 
who make up these communities. 
systematic reflection with conclusions 
and recommendations
responsibility in Catholic social teaching 
and papal teachings
The following terms within Catholic Social Teaching address the value of 
responsibility in the context of human moral attitudes towards threats to 
civilisation and concern for culture: person, society, freedom, awareness, 
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law, justice, the common good, solidarity, subsidiarity, and the state. 
Responsibility is a value that is embedded in each of these. The Aus-
trian researcher Alfred Klose believed that the gradual democratisation 
of all areas of social life requires considering human actions in relation 
to their possible consequences. In difficult situations, it is expected that 
a person will broaden his intellectual and professional competences and 
will deepen his knowledge regarding decision making and conscious or 
informed responsibility (Klose 1985, p. 173). These expectations apply 
to individuals and to institutions that participate in decision-making and 
implementing tasks that concern social and economic life. The point of 
reference for our decisions is how a person perceives his possibilities, 
where he has real influence, how he understands his life tasks, how he 
perceives his social roles, and how he understands his moral obligations 
in the context of these roles. Being a member of the Church involves 
undertaking responsibility for oneself, one’s family (bringing up one’s 
children), one’s surroundings, and the natural environment, as well as 
engaging in the life of the local community and the state. When writing 
about political ethics from the point of view of Catholic Social Teaching, 
Bernhard Sutor linked responsibility to the virtue of prudence. The virtue 
of prudence is associated with the ability to predict the consequences 
and possible side effects of one’s behaviour. The acting person should 
check whether he is able to be responsible for the effects of his work, 
and he should take on this responsibility courageously (Sutor, 1994, 
pp. 96–97, 175). 
 Responsibility and the postulate for responsible behaviour play an 
important role in papal teaching. In Caritas in veritate, Pope Benedict XVI 
linked responsibility to the logic of gift. He argued that the economic 
sphere is not morally neutral, inhuman, or anti-social by nature. It is 
possible and desirable that the rich help the poor and bear the greater 
fiscal burden. A gift means going beyond merit. The principle behind 
gift-giving is not to have an excess of things but to share them, which is 
the relationship of love. Nothing should stand in the way of applying the 
theological logic of gift to an economic reality. Benedict XVI postulated 
that values such as friendship, solidarity, reciprocity, selflessness, and 
responsibility for others are taken into account in all economic activity 
(Benedict XVI, 2009, pp. 62–68). Christian hope stems from the fact that 
reason is courageous and from the belief that it is possible to improve 
178 mArIusz woJewodA
the political and economic reality by introducing morality into it. Without 
certain forms of solidarity, mutual trust and responsibility, the market 
cannot fulfil its proper functions. In its social context, the logic of gift 
translates into the logic of inclusion, i.e. the inclusion of those who are 
poor in various forms of professional activity, or the responsibility of 
a company for the inhabitants of the local area in which it operates. 
Ultimately, the aim is to create a specific and profound form of economic 
democracy. “Solidarity is first and foremost a sense of responsibility 
on the part of everyone with regard to everyone” (Benedict XVI, 2009, 
p. 70). 
 An attitude of responsibility can be developed in the context of civil 
society and selfless behaviour, which includes sharing one’s wealth with-
out expecting reciprocity. While the formula of civil society is something 
both understandable and readily assimilated, selfless actions seem 
rare, especially in a profit-oriented economy. Understanding life and 
work duties and responsibilities in terms of moral responsibility takes us 
back to a broader ethical and anthropological context. This also applies 
to the postulate to care for the environment. 
Human beings interpret and shape the natural environment through culture, 
which in turn is given direction by the responsible use of freedom, in accordance 
with the dictates of the moral law (Benedict XVI, 2009, p. 96).
Responsibility is global in nature and concerns not only care for natural 
resources but for all creation. It leads to a postulate to stop the thought-
less process of exploiting natural resources in order to be able to pass 
them on to future generations. The introduction and popularisation of 
new lifestyles which promote a move away from consumerism towards 
savings and sensible investment is the sign of the times.
 The issue of responsibility for the natural environment is particularly 
important for Pope Francis I. In the encyclical Laudato si’, he points 
to civilizational threats such as water pollution, global warming, loss of 
biodiversity, and, with regard to social life, the systematic deterioration 
of the quality of life of a huge number of people, and the global injustice 
that results from these factors. The responsibility that Francis I advo-
cated involves a shift of the civilizational vector and a specific change of 
the economic and cultural paradigm: 
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to replace consumption with sacrifice, greed with generosity, wastefulness with 
a spirit of sharing, an asceticism which entails learning to give, and not simply to 
give up (Francis I, Laudato si’, 2015, p. 10).
This may seem easy, but it is actually extremely difficult because the 
attitude of sharing with others (not out of an excess of goods or out of 
compassion but out of reason) goes beyond the set of tasks that we are 
used to and even becomes heroic.
 Modern man has the technological ability to influence the world and 
to thrive in a market economy, but the increase in his abilities has not 
yet been accompanied by his moral development through a deeper 
awareness of responsibility and the formation of a sensitive conscience. 
“Instead, our ‘dominion’ over the universe should be understood more 
properly in the sense of responsible stewardship” (Francis I, Laudato 
si’, 2015, p. 103). This would make us participants in God’s responsible 
creative action in the world. When we talk of the natural environment, 
we point to a special kind of relationship that takes place between 
nature, man, technology, and the economy. According to Francis I, 
responsibility follows from an understanding of the connection between 
these aspects. From this stems the postulate of integral ecology, which 
assumes that scientists, businessmen, and ecologists look for integral 
solutions that take into account the interactions within natural systems 
themselves and the interactions between natural systems and social 
and technological systems (Francis I, Laudato si’, 2015, p. 123). This 
leads to the creation of models of development in which care for the 
environment is associated with care for man and his well-being – espe-
cially for those who are “losers” in the civilizational conflict and in market 
competition for the fair distribution of wealth.
Conclusions and recommendations
In order to broaden our knowledge regarding the issue of responsibility, 
it is worthwhile familiarising oneself with the relevant concepts in the 
field of philosophy and the ethics of responsibility (see the References 
section). The thread concerning responsibility appears in encyclicals 
and other official papal documents written by John Paul II (e.g., Laborem 
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exercens, Sollicitudo rei socialis, Centesimus annus), Benedict XVI, 
and Francis I (see the References section). The issues discussed in the 
encyclicals concern the moral attitude of decision-makers (politicians 
or managers working in large companies) and their responsible actions 
with regard to sustainable economic development and environmental 
protection, which should cover caring for the poorest and the socially 
and professionally excluded. Governments, associations, and business 
corporations are expected to propose solutions that will include the poor 
and those with special needs within the rhythm of social and professional 
life. In accordance with the intentions of papal teachings, the postulate 
of sensitivity to the value of human life is associated with a responsibility 
to protect natural resources for the sake of future generations. 
 The recommended philosophical and ethical literature on responsibil-
ity includes Karol Wojtyła. (1991). Man in the field of responsibility, (ed.) 
Andrzej Szostek. Rome-Lublin: TN KUL; Karol Wojtyła. (1994). Person 
and act and other anthropological studies. In: Man and morality IV, (ed.) 
Tadeusz Styczeń and others. Lublin: TN KUL; Józef Tischner. (2003). 
Thinking in values. Krakow: Znak; Emmanuel Lévinas. (2012). Totality and 
Infinity. An Essay on Exteriority [Totalité et Infini. Essai sur l’extériorité], 
trans. Małgorzata Kowalska. Warsaw: PWN; Emmanuel Lévinas. (2000). 
Otherwise than Being or Beyond Essence [Autrement qu’étre ou au-delà 
de l’essence], trans. Piotr Mrówczyński, Warsaw: Fundacja Aletheia.
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